A.L. Long recalls a conversation with Robert E. Lee

Lee’s Military Secretary claims his chief anticipated that the battle would be fought near Gettysburg

Source: Memoirs of Robert E. Lee by A.L. Long, p. 267 - 269 (1886)

“In his view, the best course would be to invade Pennsylvania, penetrating this State in the direction of Chambersburg, York, or Gettysburg”

— A.L. Long, 1886

By the first of June, General Lee had completed his arrangements for the ensuing campaign. The army, though numerically less than it was when he commenced his operations against McClellan on the Chickahominy, had been, by its recent victories, imbued with a confidence that greatly increased its efficiency. Its spirit was now high, and it was anxious to grapple again its powerful foe, which still lingered on the Stafford Heights.

The object of the campaign being the defense of Richmond, General Lee could either continue on the defensive and oppose the Federal advance as he had recently done, or he might assume the offensive and, by bold maneuvering, oblige the Federal army to recede from its present line of operations to protect its capital or oppose the invasion of Maryland or Pennsylvania. The advance upon Richmond would thus be frustrated, and the attack upon that city delayed, at least for a time. The dispirited condition of the Federal army since its late defeat, and the high tone of that of the Confederates, induced the adoption of the latter plan.

This decision was reached by General Lee near the close of May and after the completion of the reorganization of the army, which followed the battle of Chancellorsville. Before the movement began, his plans of operation were fully matured and with such precision that the exact locality at which a conflict with the enemy was expected to take place was indicated on his map. This locality was the town of Gettysburg, the scene of the subsequent great battle.

At the period mentioned, he called the writer into his tent, headquarters being then near Fredericksburg. On entering, I found that he had a map spread on the table before him, which he seemed to have been earnestly consulting. He advised me of his designed plan of operations, which we discussed together and commented upon the probable result. He traced on the map the proposed route of the army and its destination in Pennsylvania, while in his quietly effective manner, he made clear to me his plans for the campaign. He first proposed, in furtherance of his design, to maneuver the army in such a way as to draw Hooker from the Rappahannock. At this point in the conversation, I suggested that it might be advantageous to bring Hooker to an engagement somewhere in the vicinity of the old battlefield of Manassas. To this idea, General Lee objected and stated as his reason for opposing it that no results of decisive value to the Confederate States could come from a victory in that locality. The Federal army, if defeated, would fall back to the defenses of Washington, as on previous occasions, where it could reorganize in safety and again take the field in full force.

In his view, the best course would be to invade Pennsylvania, penetrating this State in the direction of Chambersburg, York, or Gettysburg. He might be forced to give battle at one or the other of these places as circumstances might suggest, but, in his view, the vicinity of Gettysburg was much the best point, as it was less distant from his base on the Potomac and was so situated that by holding the passes of the South Mountain he would be able to keep open his line of communication. York, being some twenty-five miles farther from the mountains, was a less desirable locality.

In this plan, he had a decided object There was in his mind no thought of reaching Philadelphia, as was subsequently feared in the North. Yet he was satisfied that the Federal army, if defeated in a pitched battle, would be seriously disorganized and forced to retreat across the Susquehanna— an event which would give him control of Maryland and Western Pennsylvania, and probably of West Virginia, while it would very likely cause the fall of Washington City and the flight of the Federal Government Moreover, an important diversion would be made in favor of the Western department, where the affairs of the Confederacy were on the decline. These highly important results, which would in all probability follow a successful battle, fully warranted, in his opinion, the hazard of an invasion of the North.

The plan which he thus indicated was already fully matured in his own mind and the whole line of movement was laid down on the map. He alluded to the several strategic points in Maryland but did not think it would be advisable to make any stand in that State for the same reason as before given. This interview took place about two weeks before the movement began. The proposed scheme of operations was submitted to President Davis in a personal interview, and fully approved by him.

General Lee entertained the reasonable expectation that with his powerful cavalry, he would be able to obtain all necessary supplies in Pennsylvania. It was his intention to subsist his soldiers in the country of the enemy, and he knew that the fertile Cumberland Valley could supply an army of any size. He had strong confidence in the success of this movement, relying greatly on the high spirit of his army and the depressed condition of Hooker's forces. Everything, indeed, seemed to promise success, and the joyful animation with which the men marched North after the movement actually began, and the destination of the army was communicated to them appeared a true presage of victory.It all begins with an idea. Maybe you want to launch a business. Maybe you want to turn a hobby into something more. Or maybe you have a creative project to share with the world. Whatever it is, the way you tell your story online can make all the difference.